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This thesis is intended to become a portion of the textbook
to be utilized in the course entitled "Warheads and
lethality" (AE-3705) . The text will include an unclassified
discussion of the development of anti-aircraft weapon
systems intended for defense against hostile manned aircraft
and guided missiles. In particular, this thesis discusses
the basic concepts, some history, the terminology, and the
damage producing aspects of the generic air defense system.
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A. WHAT IS AIR DEFENSE?
Air defense is the attempt to destroy hostile missiles
and aircraft or to reduce their effectiveness prior to the
completion of their designed mission. The primary purpose
of air defense is tc provide protection for the surface
forces. These forces may consist of supply carriers, amphib-
ious units, or vessels deployed for submarine detection or
other military or commercial function. The air defense
system must either deny the enemy accurate targeting infor-
mation on any high value units (HVU) , cause the enemy to
expend resources in crder to gain the targeting information,
or destroy the enemy prior to their arriving at their
maximum weapon release range. These goals can be accom-
plished through the use of lcng- range shipboard weapons,
including the guns and missiles of sea-based aircraft, of
long-range, land-based weapons and aircraft, of short-range,
self defense (close-in) weapon systems, of deception tech-
nigues, and of evasive tactics.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1 • Early Years
Air defense has developed through the years propor-
tional tc the need to counter the current air threat. The
earliest forms of air threats were hot air balloons. In the
Civil War, hot air balloons were utilized for gathering
intelligence on enemy locations and maneuvers. This practice
was not particularly appealing because of the high vulner-
ability of the balloons to anti-aircraft fire. The Navy, on
the other hand, was attracted to this concept in warfare by
the possible sea reconnaissance capabilities and the endur-
ance of the balloons. By 1870, balloons were being used to
carry messages and as a means of transporting personnel from
besieged encampments.
In 1899, the British experimented with man-lifting
kites for early warning and intelligence gathering, but with
very little success. In the later part of the seventeenth
century, a Frenchman, Francesco de Lana introduced the idea
of using an aircraft as a weapon. He proposed that one could
drop hot pieces of iron on ships, houses, fortresses, and
troops with little danger being presented to the aircraft.
The idea was rejected as being an unethical means of
conducting warfare. In 1903, the Wright brothers developed
the first power driven biplane that was equipped for
controllable flight. With this invention, machine warfare in
the air began to take on a new dimension.
2- World War I
Initially, airplanes and balloons were used in WWI
to spot the fall of artillery and for reconnaissance. These
aircraft carried no armament and their only measure of self
defense rested in their distance from the enemy.
Germany was the first country to utilize aircraft
with machine guns for war purposes, and she introduced
zeppelins in her raids on England. The bombing attacks were
not very successful at the beginning due to poor accuracy,
consequently not much interest for air defense was gener-
ated. These early aircraft attacks were generally concen-
trated on war production areas such as ammunition factories,
railways, and bridges rather than on weapon carrying plat-
forms such as ships and armies. The war philosophy and
policy at this time attributed to the lack of the develop-
ment of weapon systems to counter the air threat.
3 • E°£i^ Ka.r II
After WWI a greater awareness of the vulnerability
of surface units and the population centers to air attack
was realized. The U.S. Navy conducted experiments to study
the feasibility of aircraft attacking ships with bombs and
torpedoes. Worldwide philosophy gradually changed to one of
acceptance of attacking vital enemy centers as a means of
quickly attaining victory. Aircraft could allow an increased
measure of security by attacking the enemy's ships and
armies while yet far away from their objective, and could be
utilized to support armies in overland fighting.
World War II saw numerous advances in air weapons
and consequently in air defense strategies to counter these
weapons. Germany initialized the "Modern Warfare" by bombing
Poland. The Allies became painfully aware of their vulner-
ability to the German air raids and set out to deal with
this new threat. Fighter aircraft were developed to attack
the bombers. Improved anti-aircraft guns were manufactured
and strategies were introduced to confuse the enemy.
The development of radar brought about a significant
change in air defense. Aircraft were more easily detected
and at greater ranges than with prior optical instruments.
Later, anti-aircraft guns were developed that were slaved to
the radars, which provided mere accurate aiming of the
weapons. Airborne radar also brought about improved naviga-
tion for the aircraft and more accurate target identifica-
tion. One navigation radar development worthy of note was
"OBOE", which consisted of two ground based radar systems
that provided position information to the attacking aircraft
and resulted in more accurate tombing. In this system, an
aircraft receiving the two separate radar signals could
pinpoint its present location and then fly on a predeter-
mined route to the intended target. The drawback of this
system was that only one aircraft could be guided at a time,
and the system was range limited to the radar horizon.
U . Present Day
Because of the continuirg improvements in air attack
and the introduction of missiles, air defense has become a
field of intense development. Paster aircraft, longer range
weapons, improved delivery capabilities, and advanced tech-
nologies that allow the weapons and the weapon carrying
platforms to travel with little probability of detection
create severe obstacles for today's defense systems.
Presented with these challenges, new advances have occured
in early warning systems, and long range anti-air weaponry.
Defensive close-in weapon systems that detect and destroy
incoming missiles and aircraft without human intervention
have been developed and satellites are now employed for
targeting and intelligence gathering. Improved electronic
warfare techniques identify enemy electronic emissions,
provide deceptive measures to ccnfuse the foe and denys the
reception of electronic data by unauthorized forces.
Air defense, in the United States today, is prima-
rily patterned as a function cf competitiveness with the
Soviet Union. Since WWII, the Soviet Union has engaged in
tremendous efforts tc widen her influence abroad, through
the generation of a strong military posture. The Soviet
Union's transformation into a global power in a political
and military sense began under Khrushchev and has continued
under Brezhnev and Kosygin, and its development is expected
to continue in the decade to follow.
Soviet policy involves creating a military power
that can support a political strategy of worldwide dimen-
sion. Perhaps the only controlling factor in this policy is
an acute awareness of the destructiveness involved in a
nuclear conflict. Because of this concern, emphasis is
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placed on the development of a mobile and versatile conven-
tional force. This has been particularly evident in the
development of the Soviet Navy. The present growth in Soviet
Naval power is probably in response to the "loss of face"
experienced in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Current Soviet policy appears to be one of poss-
essing a better worldwide general- purpose naval capability.
There has been a marked increase in sea based aviation plat-
forms, helicopter carriers, and VSTOL carriers. The subma-
rine and surface force capabilities of launching anti-ship
missiles has dramatically improved.
Indeed, the Soviet Union has increased its visi-
bility around the world and is a serious competitor in mili-
tary power. The West has been slow in perceiving these
changes in Soviet strength, and as a result has lost the
clear superiority it once took for granted. Air defense
systems must continue to improve to contain the new
aircraft-capable Soviet Navy. These systems must be
prepared to deal with numerous high speed missiles and
aircraft, weapon-carrying helicopters, modern electronic
warfare devices, and the advances in weapon delivery
techniques.
C. AIR DEFEHSE TERMINOLOGY
In order to become proficient in air defense analysis
and design, one must become familiar not only with the
specific threats, tut also with the proper usage of generic
terms and the various terminology concepts. The major
subfields that comprise the air defense topical field are
shown in Figure 1.1. This topical field contains those
subfields which are used to describe the weapon characteris-
tics, the operations and the lethality. Weapon characteris-



















Figure 1-1 Air Defense Topical Field
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artillary or surface-to-air missiles, the warhead descrip-
tors, such as armor-piercing or shaped charge, and the asso-
ciated damage mechanisms, such as blast or fragments.
Operations refers to those inherent capabilities and envi-
ronmental factors which relate to the ability of the defense
system to perform its basic firing/launch functions. For
example, environmental factors include threat mobility,
locational adaptability, and weather capability. The firing
and launch capabilities include slew rate, rate of fire, and
intercept envelope. lethality refers to those factors which
relate to the fire ccntrol, trajectory, and terminal effects
of the weapon in the process of directing, projecting, and
activating damage mechanisms toward the target. Fire control
factors consist of items such as aiming error, lead angle
prediction, and tracking error. Trajectory factors include
ballistic dispersion and gravity drop. The terminal effects
parameters include projectile caliber, equivalent weight of
TNT, and fragment density.
The terms above do not reflect any interaction between
the damage mechanisms and the target. The descriptors relate
to to the inherent capabilities of the air defense system.
The System Response topical field, shown in Figure 1.2
contains those terms which are used to describe the interac-
tions of the damage mechanisms and the target, i.e., the
damage processes. Damage processes are phenomena such as
penetration and blast loading. This field also contains the
target lethality criteria, which define the conditional
response of the target to the damage processes, and the
response measures, which are quantitative measures of the
interaction between the damage mechanisms and the target.
The assessment of the lethality of an air defense system
against a particular air target involves the combination of
the air defense topical field and the system response
topical field. The connection between the air defense
13
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Figure 1.2 System Response Topical Field
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topical field and the system response topical field is often
difficult to grasp because of the misuse of many of the
terms and concepts. The dotted line in Figure 1.3 connecting
the damage mechanisms, the terminal effects parameters, and
the damage processes subfields illustrates one of the more
confusing connections. Figure 1. 4 gives a comparison of
example terms in these three subfields which in the past
have been commonly, but erroneously, interchanged, with
resulting ambiguity.
D. WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS
The weapon characteristics of interest here are those
descriptions that relate to the weapon type, the warhead
type, and the damage mechanisms. The warhead type and
damage mechanism characteristics will be covered in detail
in Chapter III.
1 . Weapon Types
Weapon type denotes the general classification of
the weapon element in terms cf firing platform and site
type. In general, weapon elements can be grouped intc two
types: terminal and ncn-termina 1, as shown in Figure 1.5.
The non-terminal weapons do not in themselves
possess a capability to inflict damage. They are the elec-
tronic and/or optical systems used to support the terminal
weapon elements. These elements normally consist of detec-
tion and early warning, target tracking, electronic counter-
measure (ECCM) , fire control, and communication systems.
They can be land-, sea-, or air-based and are normally an
integrated part of the air defense's force. Their purpose is
to supply target position, speed, and heading information to













































































































































Figure 1.5 Weapon Types
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Terminal weapon elements have the capability to
cause damage to the airborne target. They consist of the
firing platform and the weapon propagator.
2 • Firing P latf orms
Terminal weapon platforms are divided into four
categories: guns, missile launchers, airborne interceptors,
and directed energy devices.
a. Gun
A gun is a device, including any stock,
carriage, or attachment from which projectiles are propelled
by the force of an explosive reaction. It includes weapons
of various sizes ranging from hand-held small arms to much
larger transportable or stationary anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) .
b. Surface-tc-Air Missile (SAM) Launch and Guidance
Equipment
This surface platform is used to launch and
guide SAM's to an intercept point. SAM launch and guidance
equipment varies in size from a single hand-held launch tube
to a semi-permanent complex containing numerous compartments
of equipment and launch units. The system may employ both
optical and radar target tracking in conjunction with
special missile tracking and guidance computers.
c. Airborne Interceptor (AI)
This is a high performance, highly maneuverable
aircraft designed to engage the aircraft and destroy air
targets. Weapon systems employed by the airborne interceptor
include air-to-air guns, missiles, and the associated eguip-
ment for identifying, tracking and firing the weapons.
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d. Directed Energy Device
Weapon systems which produce a beam of electro-
magnetic radiation with intensity sufficient to damage a
target are called directed high energy weapons (DREW) . In
addition to melting or thermally degrading portions of the
target, these weapons may do more subtle damage by over-
loading or blinding the various electromagnetic and optical
sensors on the target.
3 • ii£§.I2PA Pro pagat ors
Weapon propagators are divided into three catego-
ries: projectiles, guided missiles, and radiation.
a. Projectiles
A projectile is an object initially propelled by
an applied exterior force and continuing in motion by virtue
of its own inertia, as a bullet, bomb, or shell. The term
projectile is generally used to represent the device
containing the warhead. This propagator is usually associ-
ated with small arms and AAA.
Small arms are guns that fire projectiles up to
and including 14.5mm in diameter. The term small arms is
generally used to denote guns with calibers 7.62mm (30 cal)
,
12.7mm (50 cal), and 14.5mm. These weapons usually employ
visual or optical tracking and are fabricated in differing
barrel configurations, usually one to four. Most projectiles
fired by these weapons are of the ball (B) , armor-piercing
(AP) , or armor-piercing-incendiary (API) type, except for
the 14.5mm machine gun which is also capable of firing a
high explosive incendiary (HE-I) and an incendiary tracer







Figure 1-6 Typical AP-I Projectile
AAA denotes that category of guns that fires
projectiles greater than 20mw ir size. (The entire group of
automatic weapons larger than 12.7mm is also referred to as
anti-aircraft or AA guns) . AAA is generally standardized to
calibers 23mm, 30mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm, although
there are some types with caliters greater than 100mm. The
projectiles are either high-explosive (HE) or armor-piercing
(AP) , and they may contain incendiary (I) and/or tracer (T)
material. Figure 1.7 shows a 23am HE-T projectile. The guns
that fire these projectiles may be land-, sea-, or air-based
and may employ either optical cr radar tracking, or both,
like small arms, AAA may have either single- or multiple-
barrel configurations.
b. Guided Missiles
A guided missile is an aerospace vehicle, with
varying guidance capabilities , which is self-propelled
through space for the purpose of inflicting damage on a
21
TRACER MATERIAL CASE
BAND HE CHARGE DETONATOR
Figure 1.7 HE-T Projectile
designated target. (An unguided missile is called a rocket
and is normally not a threat tc airborne aircraft.) These
propagators contain a propulsion system, a warhead section,
a guidance section, and one or more sensors. Movable control
surfaces are deflected by commands from the guidance section
to direct the missile in flight. Some missiles are depen-
dent on off board equipment for guidance commands, while
others are able to guide themselves independently after
launch. The various kinds of missile guidance will be
discussed in Chapter II. A sketch of a typical missile
configuration is given in Figure 1.8. The two types of
missiles that pose a threat tc airborne aircraft are the
air-tc-air or air-intercept missile (AAM or AIM) and the
surface-to-air missile (SAM) .
Air-to-air missiles are launched from inter-







Figure 1.8 Typical Missile Configuration
techniques, some form of homing is the primary typ€ of
guidance used due to weight constraints in the launch plat-
form. Weight constraints in the missile itself dictate the
use of relatively small warheads.
Surface-to-air missiles are those launched from
land- or sea-based platforms. They have varying guidance and
propulsion capabilities which influence their launch enve-
lopes relative to the target. They employ various, and in
many cases sophisticated, electronic coun ter-countermeasure
schemes to enhance their effectiveness. Because weight is
not as much of a constraint for the SAM's, these missiles
are often much larger than their air-to-air counterparts,
and they can have larger warheads and ranges.
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c. Radiation
Radiation is energy transmitted as either parti-
cles or waves through space at the speed of light. Radiation
is capable of inflicting damage when it is transmitted
toward the target either in a continuous beam or as a high-
intensity, short duration pulse. Weapons utilizing radiation
as the propagator are referred to as directed high energy
weapons (DHEW) and are predicted to become operational
within the next decade.
There are three types of radiation that are
propagated by the DHEW. They are the coherent electromag-
netic flux, the noncoherent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) , and
charged nuclear particles. The coherent electromagnetic flux
is produced by the High Energy laser (HEL) . The HE1 gener-
ates and focuses electromagnetic energy into an intense
concentration or beam of coherent waves which is pointed at
the target. This beam of energy is then held on the target
until the absorbed energy causes sufficient damage to the
target to result in its eventual destruction. Radiation from
a laser that is delivered in a very short period of time
with a high intensity is referred to as a pulse-laser team.
The acronym laser stands fcr Light Amplification by
Stimulated Emission of Radiation.
A noncoherent electromagnetic pulse, or EMP,
consists of an intense electronic signal of very short dura-
tion that travels through space like a radio signal. When an
EMP strikes an aircraft, the electronic devices in the
aircraft can be totally disabled or destroyed. The effects
of EMP were first ohserved and measured during the high
altitude nuclear testing that took place in the early
1960's, and since that time EMP has generated considerable
interest and concern. In the past, EMP of sufficient energy
to qualify as a threat has been generated only by nuclear
24
detonation. Aside from the very real threat, however,
present technology trends indicate that nonnuclear weapons
capable of sufficient power to generate a real EMP threat to
aircraft may become operational within the next decade.
The charged particle beam weapon is the newest
of the developing threats and utilizes radiation in the form
of accelerated sub-atomic particles. These particles, or
bunches of particles, may be fccused on the target by means
of magnetic fields. Considerable target damage can result.
This type of weapon has the advantage that it will propagate
through visible moisture which tends to absorb energy gener-
ated by the HEL.
E. THE BIG PICTURE
The sequence of events in an encounter between an air
defense system and an air target is referred to here as the
big picture. This text will present air defense as viewed
from a typical task force. This generic formation will
consist of a single high value unit (the aircraft carrier)
supporting aircraft, and several ships with medium range
missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Although utilizing a task
force viewpoint, it should be noted that these basic
concepts of air defense may apply to any air defense role.
The scenario shall begin with the detection of an
unknown aircraft approaching the formation. Suppose, for
example, a single air contact is detected by radar and then
tracked continuously to aid in gaining its identity and
determining its flight parameters.
If the target's identity is unknown or evaluated as
hostile, then the contact will be assigned to a fire control
system for accurate tracking. A particular weapon type, in
this case a missile, is selected and the weapon is prepared
for delivery. The fire control system shall compute launcher
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orders, intercept data, missile commands, and may present
reccomendations to improve the probability of gaining a
target kill. The missile is then fired, and guided to its
predicted intercept point. Upcn intercept the missile is
commanded to explode via fuzing action, and the damage
mechanisms will be delivered to the target. The firing unit
must then evaluate the results of the shot, and if needed
additional action may be required to destroy the target.
The scenario to be considered is that the task force is to
defend itself against air targets using gun systems, missile
systems and the associated air defense equipment. The entire
scenario from detection to destruction of a hostile aircraft
will now be considered in more detail.
26
II. OPERATIONS MD LETHALITY
As stated previously, air defense consists of three
broad areas; Characteristics, Operations, and Lethality.
The Operations field consists of those environmental factors
and inherent capabilities that relate the ability of the air
defense system to perform its basic functions. The
Lethality field refers to the collection of factors that
relate to the fire control, the propagator trajectory, and
the terminal effects parameters.
A. INHEBENT OPEBATICHAL CAPABILITIES
The sequence of events in almost any encounter between
an air defense system and its target is somewhat the same.
There are six distinct phases incorporated in the inherent
capabilities of the air defense system; Search and
Detection, Track and Evaluation, Fire Control Acquisition
and Track, Launch/Firing, Trajectory and Guidance, and Final
Evaluation. Figure 2. 1 illustrates a typical pattern of
events that may occur in an air defense encounter.
1 . Search and Detection
For any air defense system to function, it must
first be able to detect the presense of aircraft at a range
that will allow enough time to evaluate the possible threat
and to deliver weapons to counter the threat prior tc the
aircraft accomplishing its objective. The threat can be
guided or unguided. It may be maneuverable or may fly on a
preset path. It may travel at high altitudes or just above
the surface, and it may travel at subsonic or supersonic















Figure 2.1 Operations Flow Chart
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presense of the threat and to ^rovide the necessary data to
enable the determination of the threat's capabilities within
this wide spectrum.
Search and detection can be accomplished by radar,
by the human eye (with or without the assistance of optical
or electro-optical devices), by the human ear (aided or
unaided) / by lasers, and by forward looking infrared devices
(FLIE) . There are three phases involved in the search and
detection for aircraft. The first is the surveillance of an
assigned area to determine the presense of targets. Second,
target parameters such as speed, number of targets, and
heading are determined. The final phase consists of deter-
mining the target's location in range, bearing, and
elevation.
There are three general detection methods utilized.
The first is an active system. It employs a self-generated
source as the sensing agent. For example, a radar is an
active system because it transmits a self- generated electro-
magnetic beam which reflects from the target to the radar
receiver. The second method is a semi-active system, which
has the agent to be sensed (radiation) transmitted from a
source separate from the detecting system. Finally, a
passive detection system is one in which receives a signal
that is generated by the target itself. An example of a
passive system is one that detects the infrared radiation
emitted from the target's heat transmitting areas, such as
hot engines.
There are several factors that may hamper the detec-
tion of targets. Some possible sources of detection error
may include electronic and thernal noise, radar array misa-
lignment, servo or mechanical vibration, target glint,
target scintillation, atmosphere propagation, and clutter.
Noise, either internal to the sensor or generated in the
environment surrounding the target, may obscure the presense
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of valid targets. Detection systems must be designed to
minimize internal noise and alsc to distinguish signals from
ambient or external noise. Other factors affecting the detec-
tion of valid radar targets includes the target radar cross-
section/ the radar transmitter power, the receiver
sensitivity/ and operator performance. Countermeasures, such
as jamming and deception techniques, may be employed by the
enemy to confuse a normally reliable system. The detection
system must be equipped to use counter- countermeasures to
bypass the effects of enemy electronic warfare tactics.
Among these counter-countermeasures are frequency diversity,
increasing transmitter power, increasing receiver sensi-
tivity, and anti-jam features such as antenna side lobe
cancellation and Moving Target Indicator devices.
2 • Tr ack and E v alua tion
The air defense system's task has only begun with
the detection of air contacts. Each aircraft detected must
be tracked accurately to provide data for evaluation
purposes and to allow the more sensitive fire control radar
to locate the target. The evaluation carried out on the
aircraft determines if the aircraft is friend, foe, neutral,
or unknown. This decision must be made as guickly as
possible to maximize the weapon firing time. One such tech-
nique is Identif icaticn Friend cr Foe (IFF) , which employs
an antenna to send an "interrogation" signal to all aircraft
detected. Friendly aircraft have equipment on board which
automatically re-transmits a signal that identifies the
aircraft. Without the returning signal, the surface unit
must make a decision as to the classification of the
contact. The decision can be made based on possible emis-
sions received from the aircraft, the flight profile of the
aircraft (low, high, fast, slow)
, the composition of the
threat aircraft (one ,few, many) , and the course the aircraft
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is taking (crossing, closing, opening). The present tactical
situation may also aid in the evaluation of the aircraft.
For example, if no hostilities are present and the surface
unit is not in a wartime environment, then a single air
contact may be assumed friendly even though no IFF is
received. If, however several aircraft are detected closing
at a high rate of speed and there is a hostile environment,
then the aircraft may be assumed hostile provided no
evidence to the contrary exists. Precautions should always
be employed, and readiness of an air defense system should
be exercised to ensure that proper tracking and evaluation
technigues are utilized to their fullest.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a possible sequence of events
from detection of an aircraft through the evaluation and
engagement decision processes. Without any identification
method, the flowchart leads to a block entitled "Apply
Doctrine". The firing doctrine should address in detail the
procedures in handling unidentified contacts. In particular,
the firing doctrine may consider such questions as; is the
aircraft in a Weapon Free or Weapon Tight area, is the
aircraft committing a hostile act, and is the aircraft pene-
trating the defense corridor? The firing doctrine will be
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
3- Zi£§_ Control Acquisition and Track
It is not enough to just detect, track, and classify
targets. Hostile aircraft that are to be engaged with anti-
air weapons must be tracked with a high degree of accuracy.
This accurate tracking is necessary to determine launching
orders, intercept positions, aiming point, and position data
for missile seekers to look for valid targets, and to deter-
mine continuous updates to the solution of the fire control













Figure 2.2 Evaluation and Engagement Flowchart
32
a. Fire Control Factors:
Fire control factors consist of the types of
fire control, the types of coverage, and the types of
errors. The usual types of fire control are an open sight,
an on-mount optical or mechanical lead computing sight,
radar, and electro-optical. Snail arms and light AAA typi-
cally use the open or on-mount sight, whereas most heavy AAA
and the guided missile systems use radar and/or a direct
view optical or electro-optical device. The types of
coverage are aimed fire (at a specific target) , sector
intercept (fire directed to a sector of air space) , barrage
(general coverage of the air space) , and any combination of
these. There are three major types of fire control error:
tracking error, aiming error, and lead angle prediction
error.
Tracking error is the error introduced into the
firing or launch and guidance operations of a weapon system
by the inability of the tracking system to provide an exact
record of the aircraft flight path. Tracking data is used
for many purposes, such as alerting appropriate threat
units , establishing tactics, establishing lead angle informa-
tion for weapon firing, and propagator guidance. Therefore
the source and magnitude of tracking errors are very signif-
icant in weapon effectiveness. The term tracking error is
used to represent the net effect of all contributors or
sources in specifying target position and rate data.
Aiming error is the error introduced into the
firing or launching operations due to the inability to
correctly position or aim the appropriate equipment in a
desired direction. Aiming errors are used to represent
errors involved in pointing or positioning a weapon or
weapon platform at the desired point predicted by the fire
control system. These errors may stem from a human inter-
face, from a machine, or from a combination of both.
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Lead angle prediction is that fire control
computational process used to establish the desired posi-
tioning or aiming information. All weapons that fire
ballistic projectiles must have some means of solving the
fire control problem. From the neasurement of current target
position and velocity, the future target position must be
estimated, weapon aim angles determined and fired so tnat
the projectile and the target will arrive at the predicted
intercept point simultaneously. Most prediction methods use
a linear extrapolation of the target's trajectory (assuming
a constant velocity) to estimate the future target position,
lead angle prediction error is the projectile miss distance
resulting from errors in the prediction of the target flight
path. Prediction errors may be the result of unexpected or
evasive target maneuvers (jinkicg) during the flight time of
the projectile or due to limitations in the process used to
predict future target position. The prediction error for any
firing situation is usually defined as the minimum distance
from the predicted intercept pcint to the target's actual
position at the time of intercept.
A typical fire cor.trol system consists of a
radar and a computer. A contact that is classified as
hostile or unknown may be assigned to a fire control radar.
The fire control radar will slew its beam to a point in
space that the search radar has designated as the target's
position. If the target is not displayed by the fire control
radar at the designated position, then a search is initi-
ated. The search is a calculated pattern designed to opti-
mize the probability of detection of the target. The
accuracy of the target location designations to the fire
control radar will be a function of the experience and accu-
racy of the search radar operator. After the target is
acguired, tracking is accomplished either automatically or
manually. Tracking provides continuous accurate data of the
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target to the fire control computer which calculates various
launch parameters for the weapon, such as seeker orders,
intercept position, intercept time, maximum and minimum
ranges, and operator recommendations.
h. Fire Control Parameters:
Some important fire control parameters are
discussed below.
0) Initial Reaction Time. This is the time
interval which elapses between the time an air defense
system is made aware of a need to be fully operational and
the time the system is ready to begin its normal operational
mode against the target aircraft.
(2) Maximum Slew Bate. This is the maximum
angular velocity in both azimuth and elevation at which the
tracking carriage can be rotated in order to begin tracking
and engaging an aircraft. The parameters which determine the
maximum slew rate include the nass of the equipment to be
rotated and the electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic power
available to rotate the equipment.
(3) Max imu m Target Detection Range. The
maximum target detection range is that range at which a
target can barely be unambiguously discerned. It is often
expressed numerically with respect to a target signature of
a standard size. For example, the maximum detection range of
a radar is generally given for a target with a one square
meter radar cross section.
(4) Acquisit ion Time. This is the elapsed
time from the alert to the time the tracker has acquired the
target.
(5) Maximum Tracking Rates. These are the
maximum rates in azimuth and in elevation that the tracking
carriage can be rotated while measuring the aircraft's
position versus time.
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4. launch ^ Firing
The decision to fire or launch a weapon should he in
accordance with the firing doctrine of the air defense
forces. The doctrine must address several elements to be
considered by the firing unit in a typical hostile
encounter. These elements include own force capabilities,
hostile force capabilities, and the firing policy.
a. Own Force Capabilities:
0) Weapons Available. Prior to engaging any
enemy target, the coordinating person or persons should be
knowledgeable in the type and guantity of weapons available,
as well as the capabilities, advantages, and disadvantages
of each.
(2) Pos ition of Own Forces. The position of
supporting forces is extremely important in assuring the
best defensive posture is achieve!. For example, if the
threat is anticipated from a particular direction, called
the threat axis , then the defending forces may be posi-
tioned in such a way as to offer the maximum protection to
the HVD.
(3) Launch gate and Rate of Fire. The rate of
fire is the number of projectiles pec unit time that can be
fired. This term is primarily used as a measure for small
arms and AAA. Launch rate is a similar term which is used in
connection with the number of missiles that can be launched
per unit time. The launch rate is dependent upon the capa-
bility of the equipment to reload the launcher with the
appropriate weapon type, applying warm up power if required,
and supplying accurate target data to the weapon directing
devices
.
(4) Muzzle Velocity. This is the velocity of
the projectile with respect to the muzzle at the instant the
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projectile leaves the barrel. This velocity is a function of
the projectile weight, firing charge, and barrel
characteristics.
(5) Max imu m Firing Range. This is the
greatest distance that a weapon can be delivered from the
firing or launching platform. The maximum firing range is
dependent on environmental factors such as wind and density
and on the weapon characteristics such as size, shape,
weight, and type of propellant.
(6) Firing and Intercept Envelopes. The
firing envelope is defined by the locus of points that
represent the current prediction of the aircraft's position
when a projectile or missile can be launched with the expec-
tation of achieving an intercept. The intercept envelope is
similar to the firing envelope except that the locus of
points now represents the location of the aircraft at the
time of intercept. The firing envelope includes the tracking
time required before a launch can occur. A typical missile
firing envelope is shown in figure 2.3. Maximum range
denotes the position of the aircraft when the launch occurs
corresponding to the maximum distance the missile can reach
and cause damage to the aircraft. The maximum launch range
depends on the target speed or Mach number and is obviously
shorter for receding aircraft than it is for approaching
aircraft. The requirement for damage is often specified in
terms of a missile miss distance, which is the closest point
of approach of the missile to the target. It may also be
expressed in terms of a minimum level of missile maneuver-
ability available or by the maximum time of missile flight
based upon the self-destruct time set in the fuze. The
maximum range at intercept is referred to as the maximum
effective range. The dead zone is that volume of space
around the launcher in which the missile warhead is unarmed





























are a function of the aircraft direction, speed, maneu-
vering, and rate limitations on the missile and its compo-
nents. Multipath effects refer to that region where
electromagnetic tracking beams reflect from the terrain or
surface to and from the aircraft. Tracking accuracy may be
severly degraded in this region.
b. Capabilities of the Enemy:
The decision to engage aircraft should be accom-
panied with a great deal of consideration of the enemy's
capabilities. Knowledge of these capabilities may be limited
depending on accurate targeting data, up-to- date intelli-
gence reports, and operator expertise. Some of these consid-
erations are the threat type ard quantity, the position of
the threat in relation with friendly forces, closing rate,
and the maximum weapon release range of the opposing forces.
c. Firing Doctrine:
The firing policy of the air defense systems
should provide information as to the optimum utilization of
weapons in a hostile encounter. The policy should discuss
the positioning of forces to maximize their weapon coverage,
and the number and type of weapons to be fired may be
dictated. For example, the situation may call for rapid
anti-air gunfire, a single missile salvo, or perhaps for a
shoot-look-shoot policy. Shcot-look-shoot is a firing
doctrine in which one missile is launched, and a second
missile is subsequently fired if the first missile fails to
destroy the target. Other variations may include a shoot-
shoot-look-shoot, or ripple firing, which calls for rapid
firing of several weapon types- Other considerations in the
firing decision should include current performance reli-
ability of weapon supporting equipment, strength of the
track, and the force mission.
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5 . Trajectory and Guidance
a. Trajectory Factors:
After a weapon has been fired, various trajec-
tory factors influence the path of the weapon from the
firing platform to the target. These factors can be divided
into two categories, those associated with non-guided propa-
gators and those associated with guided propagators.
Non-guided propagators are projectiles and
directed radiation. Some of the factors that affect the
trajectory of these propagators are discussed below.
C) Gra vity Drop. Gravity drop is a measure
of the displacement of the flight path of a ballistic
projectile attributable to the force of gravity. The gravity
drop is proportional to the time of flight and can be
approximated by (1/2) gt 2 where g is the gravitational force
and t is the time of flight.
(2) Ballistic Dispersion. This is the scatter
of impact points of projectiles about a mean point on the
target under fixed firing conditions and exclusive of aiming
and installation factors. Ballistic dispersion refers to
those variations in the impact point attributable only to
gun and ammunition characteristics. Some causes of ballistic
dispersion are weight and surface variations between projec-
tiles, variation in burning efficiencies, and variations in
the aerodynamic forces on the projectile.
(3) Ballistic Coefficient. This is a measure
of the attenuation of the velocity of a projectile or frag-
ment in transit from the platform to the target. Ballistic
coefficients are normally in approximating formulations to
determine average speed or time-of-flight for the
projectile.
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( 4 ) Thermal Blooming.. Thermal blooming is a
non-linear dispersion of electromagnetic radiation due to
atmospheric index-of-refraction changes caused by molecular
absorption of the propagating energy. When a beam of elec-
tromagnetic radiation passes through a gas, some of its
radiant energy will be absorbed by the gas molecules and
transformed into kinetic energy. The resultant temperature
rise will force the gas particles away from the beam until
the particle density has been reduced to the proper level
for that particular temperature and pressure. If the beam is
non-uniform, i.e., more intense at the center than at the
edges, the resultant atmospheric density will be less at the
center. Hence, the atmospheric index of refraction, which is
proportional to density, will vary across the beam. Since
light rays are bent away from areas of low index of refrac-
tion, a dispersion cf the beam results. The magnitude of
this dispersion effect depends on many factors, such as
radiation wavelength, beam intensity, time of radiation in a
particular direction, and the atmospheric conditions.
(5) Atmospheric Attenuation. This is the
attenuation of electromagnetic radiation energy as it propa-
gates through the atmosphere due to absorption by gases and
scattering by particles.
b. Guidance Methods:
Guided propagators can be guided missiles or
guided projectiles. However, since most anti-aircraft
guided propagators are guided missiles, this terminology
will be used here. The guided missile system contains a
guidance package that attempts to keep the missile on a
course that will eventually lead to an intercept with the
target.
Several types of guidance are possible, and a
given missile system may use mere than one type. For most
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anti-aircraft applications, the types include command, team-
rider, homing, and retransmission.
(1) Command G ui dance. Command guided missiles
are those whose guidance instructions or commands come from
sources outside the missile. Figure 2. 4 illustrates one
example of a command guidance system. In this type of
guidance, a tracking system that is separate from the
missile is used to track both the missile and the target.
The tracking system may consist of two separate tracking
units, one for the missile and one for the aircraft, or it
may consist of one tracking unit that tracks both vehicles.
The tracking can be accomplished using radar, optical,
laser, or infrared systems. A radar beacon or infrared flare
on the tail of the missile can be used to provide missile
position information to the tracking system. The target and
the missile ranges, elevations, and bearings are continu-
ously fed to a computer. Usirg the position and position
rate information, the computer determines the flight path
the missile should take that will result in a collision with
the target. It compares this computed flight path with the
predicted flight path of the missile based on current
tracking information and determines the correction signals
reguired to move the missile control surfaces to change the
current flight path to the new one. These command guidance
signals are sent to the missile receiver via the missile
tracking system, a separate command link, such as a radio,
or by a wire between the launching platform and the missile.
Besides steering instructions, the command link may be
reguired to transfer ether instructions to the missile, such
as fuze arming, receiver gain setting, and warhead detona-
tion. The specific path along which the missile is navigated
is determined by the type of guidance law used by the
system. A particular type of command guidance and navigation



















line-of-sight between the tracking unit and the target is
known as command-to-line-of-sight (CLOS) or three point
guidance. This type of guidar.ce is sometimes mistakenly
called beam-rider guidance. Command guidance is used mostly
with short range missile systems because of the relatively
large tracking errors that occur at long range.
(2) Beam-rider Guidance. In the beam- rider
types of guidance, illustrated in Figure 2.5, and Figure
2.6, the aircraft is tracked by an electromagnetic beam
transmitted by a tracking system off-board the missile. The
guidance equipment in the missile includes a rearward facing
antenna that senses the target tracking beam. Steering
signals that are based on the position of the missile with
respect to the center of the tracking beam are computed in
the missile and are sent to the control surfaces. These
correction signals produce control surface movements
intended to keep the missile as nearly as possible in the
center of the target tracking beam. The missile can thus be
said to ride the beam; it does not see the target. The
narrow, pencil-like tracking beam is sometimes referred to
as the guidance beam. There is usually a wider, lower power
beam used to capture the missile shortly after launch, and
for this reason it is referred to as the capture beam. The
beam that the missile rides can either track the aircraft
directly, or a computer can be used to predict the direction
the missile beam should be pointing to effect an eventual
collision with the target. In this situation, a separate
tracker is required to track the target.
The beam-rider missile guidance has both
advantages and disadvantages. It permits the launching of a
large number of missiles into the same target tracking beam,
since the guidance equipment is carried in the missile.
This, however, causes the missile to be rather large and


















































narrow to insure an intercept, and the chance of loss of the
missile due to target maneuvering and evasion is increased.
The problem of large tracking error for long range targets
usually restricts beam-rider missiles to short range.
(3) Homing Guidance. A homing guidance system
is one that can determine the position of the target and can
formulate its own commands to guide itself to intercept.
With homing guidance, the tracking error is usually reduced
as the missile approaches the target. There are three major
types of homing systems: active, semi-active, and passive.
These are illustrated in Figure 2.7.
If the aircraft is tracked by electronic
radiation equipment in the missile, the system is referred
to as active. An example is a system that uses a radar
transmitter located on the missile to illuminate the
aircraft and then uses the radar reflections from the target
for guidance. A major advantage of active homing is the fact
that the missile can be launched and forgotten by the firing
unit with no further tracking required. This is referred to
fire-and-forge t or launch-and-leave. Disadvantages of active
homing are the additional weight and expense for each
missile and the fact that the radiation from the missile can
reveal its presence.
If the aircraft is illuminated by a
tracking beam from seme source not on the missile, and if
the beam reflections from the aircraft in the direction of
the missile are used for guidance, the system is referred to
as a semi-active homing (SAH) system. The missile may also
require direct illumination in a rearward facing receiver
for comparison with the reflected signal from the target.
With this type of guidance, the aircraft may know it is
being tracked, but it does not know if a missile has been
launched. A SAH missile may or may not require continuous



















from a requirement for a continuous illuminator per target
to a system with a single illuminator that can track and
illuminate several targets on a time-share basis. This is
referred to as sample-data SAH.
Passive homing systems use electromagnetic
emissions or natural reflections from the aircraft itself
for guidance. One example is an infrared homing guidance
system which closes in on the heat generated by the target.
Another example is the anti-radiation missile that homes in
on radar navigation, fire control signals, or on jamming
signals emitted from the target.
CO Retransmission Guidance. Retransmission
guidance, also known as track- via-missile (TVM) , is the
latest technigue to be used tc direct missiles toward air
targets. An illustration of TVM is given in Figure 2.8.
Typically, a radar tracking system tracks both the target
and the missile, as in command guidance. In TVM, the target
tracking beam also serves as a target illuminator and a
receiver on the missile detects the reflected radiation, as
in semi-active homing guidance. The information on the rela-
tive target angular position gathered by the missile is
relayed to a control unit. Guidance equipment at the control
unit processes the echo received directly from the target
and the information on target position received from the
missile and determines appropriate guidance commands. The
guidance commands are sent to the missile on a data link.
The tracking system usually has the capability to track
several targets at one time, and the control system can
direct several simultaneous engagements between missiles and
aircraft.
c. Guidance Phases:
Missile guidance is generally divided into three




























phase is the period cf time fiom missile firing until the
booster burns all of its fuel. The missile may or may not be
guided during this phase. The midcourse phase is usually the
longest phase in both time and distance traveled. During
this phase, guidance may be required to bring the missile on
to the desired course and to ensure it remains on that
course. The terminal phase is the last phase of guidance and
must have high accuracy and fast reaction to ensure inter-
cept with the target.
Generally, no one type of guidance is best
suited for all three guidance phases. Consequently, many
missile systems use more than one type of guidance, with
each one operating during a certain phase of the missile
trajectory. These systems are referred to as hybrid or
composite guidance systems. A system may use beam-rider
guidance or semi-active homing from launch until midcourse,
at which time the guidance switches to active or passive
homing for more accurate tracking and guidance during the
terminal phase. This combination also allows the launching
platform to break. away from the engagement earlier than
otherwise possible. Several types of guidance may also be
used sequentially or simultaneously to avoid any
coun termeasures employed by the aircraft, such as the use of
a decoy flare to draw an infrared homing system off of the
radiation from the aircraft. If an active homing system is
used in conjunction with a passive system, the missile may
reject the flare and continue tcward the target.
d. Guidance Navigation Laws:
Guidance systems can use any one of several
methods or laws to navigate a missile along a trajectory or
flight path. Four common laws are pursuit, lead angle,
command-to-line- of- sight , and proportional navigation. The
specific target flight path information required by the
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guidance package depends on which law is used. Some of the
most important items of information are the angle between
the missile heading and the line- of- sight (LOS) from the
missile to the target, the target range, and the rate of
change of both the LOS angle and the range.
In the pursuit trajectory, illustrated in Figure
2.9a, the missile flies directly toward the target at all
times. Thus, the line-of-sigh t between the missile and the
aircraft is maintained essentially along the heading of the
missile by the guidance system. Missiles flying a pursuit
course usually end up in a tail chase situation, similar to
a dog chasing a rabbit. There are two basic objections to
the pursuit method. First, the maneuvers required of the
missile become increasingly difficult during the last, and
critical stages of flight. Second, the missile speed must be
considerably greater than the aircraft speed. The sharpest
curvature of the missile flight path usually occurs near the
end of the flight. At this time, the missile must overtake
the aircraft. If the aircraft attempts to evade, the last-
minute angular acceleration requirements placed on the
missile could exceed its aerodynamic capability, and thus
cause a large miss distance. Near the end of the flight, the
missile is usually coasting because the booster and
sustainer motorthrusts last for only a short part of the
flight. Consequently, more energy is required to make short
radius, high speed turns at a time when the missile is
losing speed and has the least turning capability. The most
favorable application of the pursuit course is against slow-
moving aircraft, or for missiles launched from a point
directly to the rear of the aircraft, or head on to an
incoming aircraft.
In the lead angle or constant bearing trajec-
tory, shown in Figure 2.9b, the guidance system directs the
missile along a path that results in an eventual intercept
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a. PURSUIT
Figure 2.9 Missile Trajectories
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with the aircraft. For constant-speed, non-maneuvering
aircraft, the LOS hetween the missile and the aircraft
remains at a constant angle, and the missile flies a
straight line trajectory. This is often referred to as a
collision course. If the aircraft changes direction, the new
lead angle required fcr a collision is determined, based on
an assumed straight line target flight path, and the missile
is maneuvered to that new heading.
In the command-to-line-of-sight (CLOS) , the
missile is constantly being steered to lie on the line
between the target tracker and the target, as shown in
Figure 2.9c; thus the alternate name 3-point guidance. This
type of trajectory is typically used only in short range
missile systems. An example of a CLOS system is one in which
the target is tracked visuallv, using optics, and the
missile is tracked by a sensor at the tracker that observes
the off-axis position of the flare located on the tail of
the missile. The amount of offset of the missile from the
LOS of the tracker to the target is used by the guidance
system to determine the appropriate steering commands to
drive the missile back to the target tracking line. These
commands are then relayed to the missile over a data link,
such as a wire or radio.
The most common method for changing the missile
heading to cause a target intercept is proportional naviga-
tion or pro nav. In order to accomplish proportional naviga-
tion, the guidance system must te able to determine the time
rate of change of the LOS between the missile and the
target, as illustrated in Figure 2. 9d. This can be achieved
by equipment located on the missile or at the launching
platform. When the launching platform equipment is used, the
location of both the missile and the target must be deter-
mined. In proportional navigation, the guidance system
attempts to maintain an essentially constant LOS angle, and
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hence cause a collision by making the rate of change of the
missile heading directly proportional to the rate of change
of the LCS.
6 • Filial Evaluation
After a weapon has been launched and has completed
its flight, the air defense system must determine if the
threat has been eliminated or if the engagement should be
continued. The destruction of the aircraft can be detected
by observing sudden changes in the tracking status on the
radar systems. Such changes as rapid loss in altitude and
speed, or a sudden change in the quality of the fire control
system's track, possibly showing several smaller contacts
instead of a previous strong single contact will indicate
target damage. Other indications may be visual, audible, or
electronic.
B. ENVIEOHHEHTAL OPERATIONAL FACTORS
Environmental factors include the mobility of the air
defense system, its locational adaptability, and its weather
capability.
1 . Mobility
Mobility is the ease with which an air defense
system can be moved. Factors involved are the effort
required for disassembling, loading, transporting, and
setting up a new location sc that effective firing or
launching can be achieved. The measures of mobility are the
operational time at one location and the down-time require:!
to move from one operating site to another. Many gun systems
and some missile systems are mounted on wheeled or tracked
vehicles and can fire on the move or shortly after stopping.
Sea-based air defense systems are extremely mobile and
require no down-time in moving to new operational sites.
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2 . Locational Adaptability
Locational adaptability refers to the ability cf an
air defense system to adapt to the sites at which its opera-
tion is desired in a combat environment. Factors which must
be considered in site selection are the area required, the
terrain, and accessabilit y. Sea-based systems must consider
depth of water, navigation hazards such as shoals, and
possibly man made hazards such as mines. Ease of entry,
exit, and maneuverability are also important locational
considerations for surface units.
3 • Wea t he r Capability
Feather capability refers to the ability of the air
defense system to track and deliver the propagator to an
aircraft during variations in visibility, cloud cover,
light, and forms of precipitation. Generic measures of
weather with respect to tracking capability are discussed
below.
a. Clear Day Capable:
A clear day capable system is one with the capa-
bility to maintain track under daylight conditions with no
intervening clouds and with required visibility.
b. Clear Night Capable:
A clear night capable system has the ability to
maintain track with no cloud or visibility constraints, but
with reduced light level (i.e., half-moon, quarter-moon,
etc. ) .
c. Hazy Weather Capable:
A hazy weather capable tracker is qualified for
day or night and has ability to cope with an increased
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amount of particulate matter in the air (i.e., smoke, fog,
dust, etc. )
.
d. All Weather Capable:
An all weather capatle system has the ability to
maintain track with extremely low light levels, complete
cloud cover, and minimal visibility.
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III. QRDNAJiQE PACKAGE AMD DAMAGE MECHANISMS
The function of the air defense propagator is to bring
the ordnance package sufficiently close to the aircraft for
the purpose of inflicting damage on txie designated target.
The ordnance package consists of the warhead and possibly a
fuze. The purpose of the warnead is to provide or generate
the damage mechanisms to be delivered to the target.
Consequently, the warhead is considered to be the primary
focal point of the weapon. The different types of warheads
can be described in terms of their configuration and ingre-
dients. Since each classification of target presents a
unique tactical situation, the selection of the warhead type
is critical to ensure target destruction is optimized.
A. DAMAGE MECHAHISMS
An examination of warhead types is preceded by a discus-
sion of the damage mechanisms, damage processes, and
terminal processes associated with the payloads.
1 • Definitions
A damage mechanism is the output of the warhead that
causes damage to the target. I t is the physical description
of the tangible instrument or measurable quantity designed
to inflict damage upon the target. The conventional damage
mechanisms are penetrators, fragments, incendiary particles,
and blast. Certain missile types may utilize more than one
damage mechanism in attempting to destroy a target. For
example, a surface-to-air missile can have blast, fragments,
and incendiary particles as its primary damage mechanisms.
The missile debris caused by the warhead detonation, such as
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broken control surfaces, motor case, and other miscellaneous
parts, are secondary penetra tor-type damage mechanisms.
A damage process refers to the interaction between
the damage mechanism and the target. The conventional damage
processes are ballistic impact, penetration, ignition,
leading to a fire or an explosion, hydraulic ram, and blast
loading. Some radiation damage processes are ignition,
thermal weakening, and burn-through.
The terminal effects refer to the response or reac-
tion of the various materials, components, and personnel in
the aircraft when subjected tc the damage processes. In
order to make the design decisions, the engineer must be
aware not only of the particular type of threat, but also of
the damage processes and the terminal effects which are
caused by the damage mechanisms.
2- XZ£§s of Damage Mechanisms
a. Penetra tors:
The first damage mechanism to be discussed is
the penetrator. A penetrator can be the core of an armor-
piercing (AP) projectile, or a rod, or a shaped charge jet.
The damage processes associated with the penetrator are
ballistic impact, penetration, hydraulic ram, and ignition.
The amount of penetration through the aircraft structure,
components, and fluid is proportional to its momentum. The
penetrator velocity and mass are therefore important
parameters.
The primary damage processes caused by penetra-
tors are ballistic impact and penetration. Initial penetra-
tion usually involves piercing the skin of the target.
Penetrators with soft cores generally flatten upon impact
and create larger holes than their initial diameter. When
the penetration produces a clean hole, the section of the
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structure sheared out by the penetrator is called a plug,
and this type of penetration is called plugging. For
slightly harder material, the penetrator must tear the
surface during entry, and a crown-shaped protrusion
surrounded ly radial cracks is formed, as shown in Figure
3.1. This type of penetration is called petalling.
Figure 3.1 Petalling Damage
The velocity required for penetration is called
the ballistic limit cr V 50 fcallistic limit and is that
velocity at which 503 of the impacters penetrate and 50%
fail to penetrate. After penetration, the particle will
have a new or residual velocity, possibly a new direction,
and perhaps a new mass. Several sets of penetration equa-
tions have been developed for the residual velocity, direc-
tion, and mass of penetrators and fragments impacting
various materials found in aircraft.
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The terminal effects of impact and penetration
depend upon the element that is penetrated. In the case of
structural members (e.g., spars, ribs, skin, and longerons),
penetration can lead to a loss of load-carrying ability.
Aerodynamic surfaces, such as ailerons and rudders, can fail
to perform their aerodynamic function after penetration.
Mechanical components (e.g., hydraulic actuators, control
rods, and drive shafts) can crack, jam, or sever. Penetrated
engine components can lead to catastrophic engine failure,
fuel leakage, and engine fire. Penetration through pressure
lines or fluid containers can result in leakage, hydraulic
ram damage, subsequent injestion of fuel by an engine
through inlet ducts, and possibly fires and explosions.
Penetration through avionics components such as computers
and radar equipment, can cause a loss of signal or function
and may lead to a fire or explosion. Crew members, when
penetrated, tend to lose their ability to function, and
penetration of explosives or jropellants can result in a
fire or explosion.
When a penetrator impacts armor or a very hard
structural material, a damage process called spallation may
result. In spallation, fragments are torn off the rear
surface of the structural material. These fragments then
become damage mechanisms themselves.
When a penetratcr enters a compartment
containing a fluid, a damage process called hydraulic ram is
generated. Hydraulic ram can be divided into three phases;
the early shock phase, the later drag phase, and the final
cavity phase. Figure 3.2 illustrates the phases of hydraulic
ram. The shock phase is initiated when the projectile pene-
trates the wall of the container or tank and impacts the
fluid. As energy is transferred to the fluid, a strong
hemispherical shock wave centered at the point of impact is
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Figure 3.2 Hydraulic Ram
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entry wall in the vicinity of the entry hole which may cause
the entry wall to crack and petal. As the projectile travels
through the fluid, it usually tumbles, and its potential
energy will be transformed into kinetic energy. The projec-
tile will slow down due to viscous drag. An outwardly
propagating pressure field is generated as fluid is
displaced from the projectile path. In contrast to the pres-
sures developed in the shock phase, the fluid is accelerated
slowly so that the peak pressure is much lower, however the
duration of the pressure pulse is considerably longer. A
cavity develops behind the projectile as it passes through
the fluid. The cavity is filled with liquid vapor evaporated
from the cavity surface and with air that has entered
through the entry hcle. As the fluid seeks to regain its
undisturbed condition, the cavity will oscillate. The conco-
mitant pressures will pump fluid from any holes in the tank,
and they may be sufficient to damage other system compo-
nents. The cavity oscillation is called the cavity phase.
The hydraulic ram loading on all of the wet
walls of the tank can cause large scale tearing and
petalling. These holes may be much larger than those caused
by the actual penetrator. The hydraulic ram loading can also
be transmitted through attached lines causing failure at
fittings or other discontinuities.
A metal penetrator that impacts a metal target
at high velocity may generate incandescent particles or
vapors that are a source for ignition of flammable gasses or
combustible materials. This phenomenon is referred to as
vaporific flash.
b. Fragments:
Fragments are a daaage mechanism which can be
described as irregular metal particles varying in weight,
shape, and velocity. The difference between a penetrator and
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a fragment is the relative size, shape, and number produced.
Fragment weight is usually expressed in grains (1 gram =
15.4 grains). They nay be produced either by detonation of
an explosive warhead, or by ballistic impact.
Blast-generated fragments result from the deto-
nation of high explosive (HE) warheads. They are usually
constructed of steel and weigh between 3 and 200 grains.
Their shape may be cubic, diamond, parallelpiped , or random.
Their total initial velocity can vary from 4,000 to 10,000
feet per second, depending upon the HE type, the ratio of
case weight to charge weight, and the missile velocity.
Depending upon the fuzing technique employed, the detonation
may occur either inside or outside the aircraft. The size,
momentum, and pattern of blast-generated fragments can be
controlled by the warhead design to most effectively damage
a specific type of target. The damage processes and
terminal effects associated with blast-generated fragments
are similar to those of the penetrator previously discussed.
The damage caused by the fragments are generally more
severe than that caused by penetrators particularly when the
fragments are closely spaced. Cracks can occur between the
holes caused by the fragments, compounding the extent of the
damage.
Impact-generated fragments may occur either as
spallation of the target material or by a break-up of the
weapon at the impact point. Hard materials which resist
penetration are particularly conducive to spallation. High
speed impact by a damage mechanism, such as a fragment or
penetrator, generates an internal compression stress wave in
the damage mechanism and in the target. Interaction within
the target material between the initial compression wave and
reflected tensile stress waves off of free surfaces can
cause high tensile stresses. These tensile stresses can
cause pieces of the target material to be ejected from the
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rear surface at high (lethal) velocities. If the damage
mechanism is brittle, stresses within the mechanism itself
can reach values sufficient to shatter the mechanism after
striking a hard surface. In both cases, high velocity frag-
ments can be ejected inside the aircraft with the capability
to generate the same damage processes as a penetrator.
Impact-generated fragments also tend to disperse randomly
from the point of impact, and therefore cause damage over a
greater area than does a single penetrating round.
c. Incendiary Particles:
Incendiary particles are damage mechanisms which
include those chemical agents designed to cause combustion,
and may be added as a filler agent to certain warheads. In
an HE warhead, the incendiary material is ignited when the
warhead is detonated and is dispersed by the explosion.
Incendiary particles may also be generated by the high speed
impact of a metal penetrator or fragment on a metal surface
of the target. The damage process associated with incendi-
aries is ignition. Ignition may be followed by a fire or an
explosion.
The effectiveness and wide use of incendiaries
in anti-aircraft weapon systems stems from the vulnerability
of the aircraft fuel system to fire. Ignition and subsequent
fire may take place within the ullage or vapor space of a
fuel tank. Fires can also occur in conjunction with a pene-
tration damage process in which fuel spills out of holes
punched in tanks by penetrators or fragments and into adja-
cent void areas or dry bays. Incendiary particles igniting
the vapors from these spilled fuels can lead to eventual
loss of the aircraft due to the fire burning through the
structure, control rods, etc. Fuel is not the only flammable
material on-board an aircraft. Incendiary particles can
initiate fires in any combustible material such as hydraulic
fluid, or in gases such as vaporizing liquid oxygen.
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Under certain conditions, an explosion or deto-
nation of a fuel-air mixture ty incendiary particles can
occur. This depends primarily on the composition of the
fuel-air mixture and the intensity of the ignition source.
Fuel vapor detonated within a fuel tank ullage can cause




The final damage mechanism to be discussed is
blast. Blast is the rapid movement of a spherically shaped
pressure wave away from the center of high pressure, as in
an explosion. A typical pressure wave is shown in Figure
3.3. The pressure in the blast above the ambient pressure is
called the overpressure, and the peak overpressure occurs at
the leading edge of the wave.
The damage process associated with blast is
called blast loading. Blast loading is the stress or pres-
sure loading applied to a target as a result of the blast.
Blast loading is the combined effect of. dynamic pressure
loading (drag) and overpressure loading. In most warheads,
blast is a secondary damage mechanism. Except in close deto-
nations, blast is usually the last damage mechanism to reach
the target. If the pressure loading is sufficiently intense
to significantly damage the target, the other damage mecha-
nisms probably obtained a target kill, provided they hit the
target.
Dynamic loading is produced by the velocity of
the air in the blast with respect to the aircraft. This
damage process causes structural deformation, bending, and
tearing of cantilevered structures (wings), and dynamic















DURATION OF POSITIVE PHASE
PRESSURE FELT BY OBSERVER AT DISTANCE D
Figure 3-3 Typical Pressure Wave
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Overpressure loading is a damage process that
results from the effects of the overpressure in the blast
striking and moving ever the surfaces of the target. The
initial overpressure is eventually followed by a period of
underpressure. Any semi-closed structures or containers in
the aircraft, such as fuel tarks and hydraulic reservoirs,
can experience a sudden compression/decompression cycle.
This cycle can result in structural failure or loss of
integrity in these structures even though they were not
directly facing the blast.
B- F0ZI3G
The ordnance package is divided into two basic catego-
ries: fuzed warheads, and non-fuzed warheads. The fuze
package consists of a safety and arming device to keep the
weapon safe until it is deployed and clear of friendly
forces, a detonator to initiate tha high explosive charge, a
device that senses the presense of the target, known as a
target detection device (TDD) , and a logic circuit to
initiate the detonation at the proper time. To be effec-
tive, the detonation should occur at the point of the flight
that will cause maximum damage to the target. This "optimum
time of detonation" is a function of the flight geometry and
target type. It is often desirable to delay arming of the
warhead to prevent accidental detonation due to incorrect
fuze action.
The fuze must have the capability to determine the
proper detonation point. The data required for this calcula-
tion may be developed from energy generated by the target or
from the flight parameters of the missile itself. The data
may be obtained independently or it may be supplied througn
the guidance system of the missile. The complexity of the
fuze may vary from a rather si m tie contact-sensing device to
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one which may solve the entire fire control problem to
determine the correct detonation time.
Fuzing can he accomplished by several methods. The
simplest of these are the timed and contact fuzes associated
with the light AAA. Timed fuzes are set to detonate at a
predetermined elapsed time after firing. Contact fuzes may
detonate the charge instantaneously upon target contact
(superguick) , or after a shcrt delay. The type of fuze
chosen will depend upon whether the detonation is desired on
the external surface or within the target. High explosive
projectiles used for light AAA are normally designed to be
contact fuzed with a preset detonation delay because the
small amount of explosive used can only be effective when
detonated inside the aircraft.
Proximity fuzing, sometimes referred to as VT fuzing (a
code name used during World War II for variable time
fuzing), is normally used in conjunction with heavy AAA and
missile warheads. With proximity fuzing, the warhead is
detonated at some distance from the aircraft based upon the
fuze logic and the relative location and motion of the
target. The presense of the target is determined by a
target detection device (TDD) . The fuze TDD may be active,
semi-active, or passive. The active TDD radiates an electro-
magnetic signal, a portion of which is reflected by the
target and detected by the TDD. A semi- active TDD detects
electromagnetic energy reflected from a target that is being
illuminated by another source. A passive TDD detects elec-
tromagnetic energy that is radiated by the target itself.
Most proximity- fuzed warheads also have time and contact
fuze capabilities f cr self destruction and detonation upon
direct hits. Some missile warheads can be command detonated
by radio signals from the missile controller when the non-
terminal tracking and guidance equipment indicate sufficient
proximity to the target.
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Non-fuzed warheads are referred to as penetrator
warheads or kinetic energy penetrators and only cause damage
when direct contact is made with the target. Warheads of
this type are employed almost exclusively by small arms and
light AAA weapons.
The safety and arming (SSA) device has two functions.
First, it prevents accidental detonation of the warhead by
interrupting the path between the fuze and the payload until
a "safe" time. Secondly, it provides the detonation path by
removing the interrupter after the the safe time has
elapsed. The SSA device thus acts as a switch which remains
open until safe detonation can occur and then closes to
complete the detonation path. Normally, a physical obstruc-
tion is utilized to accomplish the safety and arming
function.
In some cases the S&A device is used as a safety device
that will self destruct the missile by initiating a destruc-
tive charge if the target is not encountered in a reasonable
time frame.
C. WABHEADS
The warhead, or payload, is the damage producing element
of the ordnance package. The damage may be created by
converting a potential energy in the form of chemical,
mechanical, or nuclear products into a destructive force.
This destructive force can be an immense explosion or a
release of chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The
appropriate warhead is determined by the anticipated target
characteristics.
Warheads are generally categorized by the type of
destructive agent or damage mechanism employed in destroying
the target.
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1 • Penetra tor Warheads
a. Ball-Type Projectiles (B) :
These projectiles contain penetrators with rela-
tively soft metal cores designed for small weapons against
personnel and unarmored targets. The soft core flattens upon
impact, creating a larger hole than would normally be made
by a harder substance of similar size and shape.
b. Armor-Piercing Projectiles (A?) :
The armor-piercing jrojectile is composed of a
hardened steel core encased in a metal jacket. It is shaped
in such a manner as to give it maximum penetrablity through
the target. This type of projectile is normally associated
with small arms and light AAA.
c. Armor-Piercing Incendiary Projectiles (AP-I):
This type of projectile is the same as the
armor-piercing projectile, except that an incendiary mixture
has been installed inside the ncse of the metal casing. The
metal jacket is designed to peel off upon impact with the
aircraft. The heat that is generated on impact ignites the
mixture, and causes an intense, long-lasting fireball. This
increases the probability of inducing a fire or explosion.
These projectiles are normally associated with small arms
and light AAA.
2- Hic[h Exp_losive (HE) Warheads
A high explosive warhead consists of a metal casing
around a high explosive core. All high explosive warheads
types are fuzed, and some may contain incendiary particles
that are ignited upon impact or detonation. They may be used
either in projectiles or in missiles. HE warheads can be
detonated by any of the fuzing methods previously discussed.
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There are four major types of HE warheads used
against aircraft. They are the blast or pressure warhead,
the fragmentation warhead, the continuous rod warhead, and
the shaped charge warhead.
a. Blast or Pressure Warhead:
In the blast warhead, the case surrounding the
HE charge is relatively thin. The primary damage mechanism
is the expanding, spherically shaped blast wave produced by
the detonation of the HE charge. The target is destroyed
because of its inability to withstand the overpressure
created by the blast wave. The overpressure wave is followed
by an underpressure wave which also causes structural
damage. The blast warhead generally has a small radius of
effectiveness due to the small amount of charge weight and
to the rapid reduction of the pressure with distance from
the detonation. As the pressure expands spherically outward
from the blast, it decreases as the volume of the sphere
increases. The energy density decreases inversely with the
volume in which it is contained, therefore the blast pres-
sure must decrease approximately as the inverse cube of the
sphere radius. The attenuation factor is actually greater
than this theoretical value because of cooling effects and
non-ideal expansion. Because of this large attenuation, most
aerial target HE warheads are used to break the case of the
warhead into many high velocity fragments, rods, and pene-
trators. These particles then become primary damage
mechanisms.
b. Fragmentation Warheads:
Many of the current aerial warheads are designed
to kill the target with fragments. A fragmentation warhead
emits a maximum number of fragments at a specified velocity.
The HE core is designed to break into hundreds or thousands
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of fragments upon detonation. These fragments are ejected at
high velocities in a narrow spherically shaped band. The
amount of damage which these fragments can cause is depen-
dent upon size, velocity, and distribution. The natural
fragmentation of a smooth case is random in size. A case
which breaks into tiny particles or into a few large pieces
is not efficient in causing damage to the target. The large
fragments could cause severe damage, but their probability
of hitting the target is minimal. The small particles prob-
ably would not cause significant damage even if they did
make contact with the target. For these reasons, fragment
cases are often designed to break up into fragments of a
particular size and shape. The fragment size would be depen-
dent upon the type of target expected to be encountered.
These cases are referred to as controlled fragmentation
cases. The desired fragment dimensions can be obtained by
scoring or grooving the inner or outer surfaces of the case,
or by wrapping the case with wire. Some cases are composed
of preformed fragments, such as steel cubes, blocks,' or small
rods that are buried in a plastic matrix. Examples of
controlled fragmentation are shewn in Figure 3.4.
Fragment density is an important parameter in
considering the damage capabilities of the fragmentation
warhead. Consider a warhead that produces an expanding
spherical shell of fragments cf the same thickness. The
surface area of this shell increases proportional to its
radius, and the fragment density will decrease approximately
proportional to the inverse of the square of the radius.
Actual warheads have even more attenuation due to drag
forces and variations in fragment size. In comparing the
attenuation effects of a blast warhead, it is shown that a







Figure 3.4 Controlled Fragment Warheads
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A fragmentation warhead can be designed tc emit
a majority of its fragments in a particular direction. When
this emission is properly aimed, the warhead can be consid-
erably more effective than the isotropically distributed
fragmentation warhead. This concentration of fragments is
referred to as a focused fragmert warhead.
As stated earlier, a fragmentation warhead is
designed to emit fragments at a specific velocity. The
attenuation of the fragment velocity is considerably less
than that associated with the velocity of the expanding
blast volume. The difference in velocities is due to the
fragment having a constant cross-sectional area, while the
surface of the blast increases as the square of the
distance. Consequently, the blast lags behind the fragments.
The design of this type of warhead requires a
knowledge of fragmentation propagation. Terminal ballistic
studies describe the laws governing the velocity, size,
shape and distribution of fragmentation warheads.
Approximately forty percent of the energy produced by a
warhead detonation is absorbed in the fragmentation process,
while the remainder is used tc establish the shock front.
The fragments generated are propelled a very short distance
at a high velocity. The fragments then pass through the
shock wave. The initial velocity of the fragments can be
estimated using the Gurney Equation.
V = ( 2E ) C/M
1+1/2 (C/M)
X
where V = Initial fragment velocity (ft/sec)
2E = Gurney' s constant (ft/sec)
C = Explosive weight (grams)
M = Case weight (grams)
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The Gurney constant is determined experimen-
tally/ and differs according to the explosive type used.
The best way to achieve high initial velocities is to have a
high charge-to-mass ratio. This may be obtained by using a
thin wall container. When a thick wall is required to with-
stand setback forces or to produce larger fragments, a more
powerful explosive must be used. Velocities of fragments
from an air burst are higher than those produced by a
warhead that detonates upon impact. This is because or the
additional velocity imparted to the fragments from the
moving missile. This is the reason that proximity or timed
fuzing provides more effective fragmentation.
c. Continuous Rod Warheads:
The continuous rod warhead consists of a bundle
of rods running length-wise around the circumference of the
case as illustrated in Figure 3.5. The rods are welded
together at alternate ends so that upon detonation of the
charge, the bundle will expand away from the blast center.
The blast is sufficient to project the rods radially outward
to form a large jagged ring shewn in Figure 3.6. The ring
will expand to about 80% of its maximum perimeter. The rods
are the damage mechanism and are particularly effective
against aircraft supports and structures. The initial
velocity of the rods is roughly half of that associated with
the fragments in the fragmentation warhead. The restricted
effective area of the continuous rod warhead, perpendicular
to the axis of the charge, limits the probability of
striking a target.
d. Shaped Charge Warheads:
The shaped charge warheads are specifically
designed to utilize a special geometry of the explosive
charge and liner to fecus the erergy of the explosion in one
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Figure 3-5 Continuous Rod Warhead
or more preferred directions. These warheads are used prima-
rily to penetrate armor/ but differ from the armor-piercing
warheads in the method of operation. The armor piercing
warhead is designed to force its way into the interior of
the target and explode to cause further damage. The unde-
formed core is the primary damage mechanism. For the shaped
charge, the warhead remains en the outer surface of the
target and produces a destructive jet which pierces the
aircraft. The focusing of energy hydrodynamically creates
one or more high velocity jets and slugs of molten liner
material which can cause much deeper target penetration.
This energy can be focused along the warhead axis (a conical
shaped charge) or in a desired array (a linear or multi-
shaped charge) to increase the cumber of jets. Shaped charge
warheads designed for aircraft are generally multi-shaped.
Figure 3.7 illustrates a typical shaped charge warhead.
A shaped charge waihead consists of four basic









Figure 3.6 The Expanding Rods
that is open in the front. The ether components are: a thin
front liner, a faze, and a detonating device. A thin nose
cone allows for proper aerodynaaic stability.
When a jet strikes a target, immense pressures
are produced at the point of contact. This pressure causes
stresses far above the yield strength of the steel and the
target material flows out of the path of the jet as a fluid.
Because of the large radial momentum associated with the
flow of the target material, the diameter of the hole
produced is considerably larger than that of the jet. As the
jet particles strike the target, they are carried radially
along with the target material. Thus, the jet is used up as









in a cone shaped spray as it exits from an armor shielding.
If the jet has enough energy tc spare after perforating the
armor, it will continue along its original path and may
cause further damage such as fire and explosions.
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